BULGARIA IN-DEPTH –

THE WEEKLY REPORT

PILOT ISSUE #1

Covers May 23 – May 28, 2026

 

Executive Summary

Key Judgments

• Rumen Radev’s first weeks in office suggest continuity rather than rupture with Bulgaria’s existing political model.
• The new government appears more likely to regroup the country’s oligarchic power structure than dismantle it.
• There are early indications of growing strategic ambiguity in Bulgaria’s foreign policy, although no evidence of an imminent departure from NATO or the EU.
• The government’s staffing decisions, parliamentary behavior, and political alliances merit close monitoring over the coming months.

 

Main Findings

Domestic Politics

• Progressive Bulgaria’s overwhelming parliamentary majority gives Radev an unusual concentration of political power.
• Early appointments indicate significant continuity with figures associated with previous governments and established political networks.
• Parliamentary voting increasingly suggests informal cooperation between Progressive Bulgaria, GERB, and DPS despite their nominal political differences.
• No meaningful steps have yet been taken against the political and economic structures commonly associated with the “Borisov-Peevski Model.”

Democracy and Institutions

• Several procedural changes in Parliament strengthen the governing majority while reducing the opposition’s oversight capabilities.
• Judicial appointments provide little indication that deep institutional reforms are imminent.
• While there is currently no evidence of outright authoritarianism, the concentration of political power deserves sustained attention.

Foreign Policy

• Radev continues to communicate different messages to different audiences.
• His rhetoric for domestic audiences remains considerably more eurosceptic and Russia-friendly than his statements alongside NATO and EU leaders.
• The government appears committed to remaining within NATO and the European Union but may seek greater room for maneuver between Western and non-Western partners.

Risk Assessment

Political Risk: High

Institutional Reform: Low probability (current trajectory)

Oligarchic Restructuring: High probability

Western Orientation: Stable in the short term, but showing early signs of strategic drift.

Bottom Line

The first month of the Radev government suggests that Bulgaria is entering a period of political continuity disguised as political change. Rather than dismantling the country’s entrenched oligarchic system, the new administration appears more likely to reorganize it under new leadership while pursuing a more ambiguous foreign policy posture toward the West.

The next several months will determine whether these early trends become permanent features of Radev’s rule or merely represent the uncertain opening phase of a new administration.

 

Editorial

Bulgaria May Have Just Entered a New Dark Age

New Prime Minister Radev Doesn’t Seem Set to Fight the Oligarchy But Regroup It. What Is Worse He Might Take Steps to Change Bulgaria’s Geopolitical Orientation Away from the West Where the Nation Naturally Belongs.

It’s been several weeks since former President Rumen Radev won Bulgaria’s latest parliamentary election on April 19, 2026, with his newly formed “Progressive Bulgaria” party, and 20 days since he formed a new regular Cabinet on May 8.

After spending 9 years, or nearly two five-year terms, in the mostly ceremonial presidency of Bulgaria, Radev won the general election in a landslide, clinching 131 seats in the 240-seat Bulgarian Parliament, the largest election victory since 1997 when the reformist right-wing Cabinet of Ivan Kostov came to power with 137 MPs.

Two “million-dollar” questions have emerged about Radev’s new rule.

First, is he going to fight Bulgaria’s existing post-communist oligarchy (epitomized by the so-called “Borisov-Peevski Model” of governance) or is he going to reshuffle and regroup it to the same abysmal end for the Bulgarian people?

Second, is Radev going to try to change Bulgaria’s geopolitical orientation away from its place in the global West (epitomized by the nation’s membership in the European Union and NATO) by shifting toward the East?

By implication the second question also carries with it a third question, namely, whether Radev will seek to subvert Bulgaria’s hard-earned, albeit imperfect, democracy, and replace it with an autocracy or a dictatorship of some kind.

In the April 19 election Radev attracted a very diverse group of voters. His murky election campaign raised certain groups of Bulgarians’ hopes on both fronts. Most of his voters seem to hope that he will somehow dare to tackle the ruling oligarchy elite. Another, though smaller, group of his voters is clearly hoping that he will ally Bulgaria with Russia and maybe China, abandoning the West.

Radev’s political history so far – from his time at the Presidency, through his questionable election campaign, to the first 20 days in power of his Cabinet – is already painting a bleak picture for those who wish to see a democratic and prosperous Western Bulgaria.

Namely, to answer the first question, Radev doesn’t seem intent on fighting “the oligarchy” and its devastating effects on Bulgaria but appears more likely to lead a regrouping that would allow a continuation of the “same old, same old” governance methods.

To answer the second question, Radev seems to be already making small steps towards shifting or at least affecting and hurting Bulgaria’s pro-Western orientation. He may not seek to take the country out of NATO and the EU, either swiftly or at all; however, he might take steps that will water down Bulgaria’s belonging to these two blocs and thus the West, while simultaneously benefiting non-Western and/or anti-Western foreign powers.

A Radev-Borisov-Peevski Triumvirate?

For the better part of the period between 2009 and Radev’s election victory in April 2026, Bulgaria’s entire existence has been dominated by the Borisov–Peevski Model – a term used by critics to describe the informal political and economic power structure associated with long-time Prime Minister Boyko Borisov and Delyan Peevski, a murky mogul and now the leader of the ethnic Turkish DPS party. (Technically, the Borisov-Peevski Model crystallized after 2014, before that it was just the “Borisov Model”.) It is an entire system of presumably corrupt governance, influence, patronage, propaganda power, clientelist business interests, and informal networks. Both Borisov and Peevski may or may not be described as “oligarchs.” There are rumors that the former has become fabulously rich since he came to power in 2009, while the latter is widely regarded as the face of the Bulgarian post-communist oligarchy.

However, the list of figures in Bulgaria’s post-communist oligarchy, which can justifiably be blamed for many, if not all, of the country’s severe problems, hardly ends with Borisov and Peevski. It’s just that these two were in power in recent years. But there are a number of prominent figures who could or could not be described as oligarchs who seem to have supported Rumen Radev and his “Progressive Bulgaria” party (which hadn’t even been founded yet) before the April 19 election. These included the Varna-based group TIM, the Bobokov Brothers, Georgi Gergov, Vasil “The Skull” Bozhkov, and Hristo Kovachki, among others. Many of these figures have reputations for being no less notorious than Borisov and Peevski.

This has been the first clue that the rule of the Progressive Bulgaria party led by Prime Minister and long-time former President Rumen Radev may well represent a regrouping of the ruling oligarchy. It might as well emerge as a new façade after the previous Borisov-Peevski Model got worn out – the new façade might be called “Rumen Radev.”

There are other signals in place a month after Radev won the election and a couple of weeks since his “Progressive Bulgaria” party assumed power. Among them is the fact that, in the Bulgarian Parliament, Radev’s party is frequently supported by Borisov’s GERB party (39 seats) and Peevski’s DPS party (21 seats).

Another is Radev’s appointments and staffing policy which seems to feature countless senior and mid-level political appointments of figures connected with GERB, DPS, or their existing or former proxies.

Not to mention that, after 9 years in office as President of Bulgaria, Radev hardly seems to have displayed any outbursts of uncompromising moral integrity that would have suggested that he would be a glorious and valiant fighter against any evil and injustice. His entire behavior so far simply does not suggest this kind of moral endeavor in Bulgarian politics.

Against this backdrop, it seems very, very likely that the Radev government will be a regrouping of the ruling Bulgarian oligarchy. The big sub-question would be whether Radev would seek to replace Borisov and Peevski with some other prominent oligarchic figures at the center of Bulgaria’s oligarchic system – such as growing richer and richer through the absorption of public (Bulgarian state budget and EU) money through public procurement, in addition to other less prominent means – or he would strike a deal with Borisov and Peevski, turning their duo into a triumvirate. That is, the Borisov-Peevski Model could easily become the Radev-Borisov-Peevski model, or, to borrow an image from Bulgarian mythology, the two-headed “lamya” (a monster similar to a hydra or a dragon) could already be becoming a three-headed one, as is common in Bulgarian folk tales.

For the time being, Radev doesn’t seem to show any intent of somehow providing the prosecution or persecution of Borisov and Peevski and their business-political interests. There hasn’t even been any talk of this from any representatives of the newly-ruling Progressive Bulgaria party.

Borisov and Peevski, who are supposed to be in opposition with their parties, have also shown no signs of rhetorical attacks or even mild criticism of Radev and his people. On the contrary, both have shifted their tone to being highly respectful of Radev, and the same goes for the so-called “Peevski media” – wretched media outlets somehow taken over by Peevski and his family in the past 20 years, which have been brutally used as vicious propaganda machines and media attack dogs.

In 2024-2025, Peevski himself frequently attacked Radev, calling him “Mr. Cash” and a “fake president,” and accusing him of taking “bribes,” having secret “cashiers,” and employing the “Road of the Koprinka” – a wordplay on the name of Radev’s close aide Nikolay Koprinkov and the Bulgarian expression meaning “the Silk Road.” His messages were of course echoed by his media outlets.

There has been none of that not just since Radev won the April 19 parliamentary election but even before that, during the election campaign.

Telling Staffing Policy

To top that off, senior or mid-level figures from the Zhelyazkov Cabinet (January 2025 – February 2026), which was headed by Borisov’s GERB party but was widely seen as completely dominated by Peevski, and which was brought down by hundreds of thousands of protesters in December 2025, have now been retained or reappointed in the Radev Cabinet or the new Parliament.

These include people such as directors of Cabinet directorates who have had long political biographies, some of them marred by scandals.

An interesting example is Milena Hristova, the new Chief Secretary of the Parliament appointed by Radev’s ally and Parliament Speaker Mihaela Dotsova. Hristova is a former MP from the Bulgarian Socialist Party, and in 2025, was a parliamentary secretary of Manol Genov, the Environment Minister in the Zhelyazkov Cabinet. Dotsova herself was the head of Genov’s Cabinet.

There are at least three ministers in the Radev Cabinet who are closely connected with the ITN (“There Is Such a People”) party of showman Slavi Trifonov, which is sometimes dubbed “little DPS,” i.e. the party of Delyan Peevski. These are Agriculture Minister Plamen Abrovski, Foreign Minister Velislava Petrova-Chamova, and Culture Minister Evtim Miloshev. All three have been described as scandalous appointments by right-wing and pro-democracy critics. Ivo Siromahov, a writer and former ally of Trifonov, has described Abrovski as a direct appointment by Peevski.

(That’s without even questioning the expertise of the respective individuals, which, in the case of the new Foreign Minister with no background whatsoever in foreign policy, seems to be highly questionable.)

In another example of critical appointments closely tied to Borisov and Peevski, both deputy finance ministers serving under the new Finance Minister and former caretaker Prime Minister Galab Donov (himself trained as a political military officer in the Communist Era), are two women – one from GERB and one from DPS.

It is interesting to note that as President, Rumen Radev appointed seven caretaker cabinets of Bulgaria in the last few years, with dozens of ministers. Yet, he somehow ended up borrowing Cabinet ministers from the ITN party, whose populist popularity has declined so much that it didn’t even make the 4% parliamentary threshold.

Another interesting observation pointing in the direction of an alliance between Radev and Peevski has been revealed by the voting in the April 19 election itself, and more specifically by the part of the Roma minority’s vote which is traditionally bought – literally – by the DPS party. Huge swaths of the Roma community in Bulgaria traditionally sell their vote for minor sums of money – about €50, and this has become a well-established fact over the past 30 years.

Journalistic investigations by the likes of DW and Free Europe have demonstrated that voters at the polling stations in Roma quarters in the cities of Pazardzhik and Plovdiv, which used to vote 60-70% for Peevski’s “DPS New Beginning” party, this time voted 60-70% for Radev’s Progressive Bulgaria, with no votes for DPS.

More evidence of some kind of grand bargain between Radev on the one hand, and Peevski and Borisov on the other, has emerged from the very recent refusal of Progressive Bulgaria to establish a parliamentary committee to investigate Peevski’s properties and other assets.

The new ruling party has also refused to set up temporary parliamentary committees to investigate the affairs of Petar Petrov, aka Pepi Evroto (“the Euro”), a former investigator now wanted, and Martin Bozhanov, aka Notariusa (“the Notary”), who was assassinated in January 2024, both of whom were involved in influencing magistrates’ appointments and decisions through backstage influence and extortion operations.

The obvious conclusion is that the Radev Cabinet increasingly seems like more of the same murky oligarchy rule in Bulgaria, a leopard that cannot change its spots – or the more things change, the more they stay the same.

One of the great expectations for Radev and his party is a tangible reform of the Bulgarian judiciary, which has been turned into a swamp of corruption and ill-minded influences. However, Radev’s appointment of his Justice Minister is hardly a sign that he is taking that expectation seriously. The minister himself, Nikolay Naydenov, is a figure completely unknown to the public who served as a secretary to the largely discredited Supreme Judicial Council (VSS) and the former even more discredited Commission for Illegal Asset Forfeiture.

There seems to be little obvious logic, if any, to Radev’s numerous appointments of people connected with Borisov’s GERB, Peevski’s DPS, and other political formations. This gives rise to suspicions of oligarchic and political dependencies of the new government that could be resting on backstage deals.

Justified Democracy Worries

Besides these suspicions there are other issues with the behavior of the Radev Cabinet and the Progressive Bulgaria majority in Parliament, which might as well be cause for concern with respect to the new rulers’ intentions regarding preservation and strengthening of Bulgarian democracy.

Such worries certainly trump the questions about government efficiency and inflating the administration – as, for instance, the Radev Cabinet has, for whatever reason, set up no less than four deputy prime minister positions without an obvious need to do so.

With Radev enjoying an outright majority of 131 MPs out of 240, which, with the likely support of GERB and DPS, turns into a constitutional majority of well over two-thirds of the parliamentary seats, any misgivings that the new Prime Minister and his people could become “drunk on power” appear at least somewhat justified.

For instance, one of Progressive Bulgaria’s prominent MPs, Slavi Vasilev, told journalists that he would be determining which reporter could ask him questions; another MP, Anton Kutev, called the Parliament “our National Assembly”; and Ivo Hristov, a notorious anti-Western operative, who is now one of the four Deputy Prime Ministers in charge of “human development,” declared that the former center-right prodemocratic coalition “We Continue the Change – Democratic Bulgaria” “is no longer necessary,” i.e. that it doesn’t need to exist.

This has come against the backdrop of the new Progressive Bulgaria majority in Parliament imposing severe limitations on the opposition parties in the new statutes of the institution. Some of the attempted limitations – such as banning the MPs from demanding documents from Cabinet ministers – have been dropped but others remain in place, including a requirement making temporary parliamentary committees practically impossible to set up at the opposition’s initiative.

To top it all off, at least part of Radev’s cadres, like himself, stem from the Bulgarian military, especially the Air Force, institutions that are, by definition, closed, hierarchical structures, and it is hard to imagine that those would be particularly eager to defend democratic values, dialogue, media freedom, and civil society.

It is worth noting that, for all his flaws, former long-time Prime Minister Boyko Borisov was highly sensitive to social processes, and often readily backtracked on controversial governance decisions when there was public opposition and disgruntlement. It remains to be seen whether the same could be true of Radev, although his background makes that less likely.

Radev’s Many Foreign Policy Faces

For all the suspicions of brutal oligarchy abuses under the Borisov-Peevski model after 2009, Borisov and eventually even Peevski, and their aides and allies, maintained Bulgaria as a nominally Western nation, never voicing doubts about its membership in the European Union and NATO.

Radev, however, who won on April 19 in a landslide largely through a consolidation of the anti-Western, anti-European and pro-Russian electorate in Bulgaria, might be a different story – and there are already certain indications that he is seeking to shift the nation’s unequivocally Western course.

On his first foreign trip, Radev circumvented the EU institutions, and instead of meeting with their leaders, he went to Germany to meet with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. This marked the first time since Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007 that the new Bulgarian leader doesn’t go to Brussels. Thus, instead of demonstrating that all EU nations are equals, he practically showed a desire to seek patronage from the EU’s largest member state Germany.

During his joint press conference with Merz, Radev repeated what he had been insisting on for years as President: namely, that the war between Russia and Ukraine had to be settled through negotiations. The German Chancellor was clearly listening to that with some irritation, and he all but scolded Radev by declaring that in order for negotiations to work, both sides need to be prepared to negotiate.

Then, in his second week, Radev went to Paris to meet with French President Emmanuel Macron, and only then did he go to Brussels where he had meetings with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.

The bigger problem, however, was that there was a striking difference between his remarks to Bulgarian media in Paris and those he made alongside Rutte and von der Leyen (there was no joint press conference with Macron).

In his remarks to Bulgarian media made at the Bulgarian embassy in Paris, Radev was speaking about how Bulgaria should limit its aid to Ukraine, and how Europe should finally agree to start negotiations with Russia – as though it has been the EU that has been rejecting the possibility of talks to end the war. (Interestingly enough, lately, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has also been insisting on the EU taking over potential peace talks with Russia, so, paradoxically, Radev’s call seems to be aligned with the Ukrainian leader’s own call.)

Then, in his press conferences with NATO chief Rutte and with EC head Von der Leyen, Radev behaved in a highly constructive manner regarding the NATO and EU plans in defense and security and the EU’s multiannual budget framework.

Many Western media have been worried that Radev with his frequent pro-Russian rhetoric in the past might become a second Viktor Orban, and rightfully so. For the time being, however, the new Bulgarian leader’s remarks with Rutte and Von der Leyen don’t offer reasons to believe that he is going to stand against the common European Union policies.

Yet, one cannot help but notice how markedly different his rhetoric was with the NATO and EU chiefs and for the domestic Bulgarian audience. It has also seemed that the ruling Progressive Bulgaria party is trying to play down this discrepancy. Radev and his party appear to be maneuvering in their public statements in order to find positions that are acceptable both to Bulgaria’s Western partners and to the relatively eurosceptic voters that brought them to power.

In his press briefings with Rutte and Von der Leyen, Radev mentioned SAFE, which is the EU program for investing in security through beneficial joint loans. With Von der Leyen Radev declared that he was prepared to take advantage of this opportunity, with over €3 billion slated for Bulgaria for purchasing and building defense capabilities. It was likely because of this money that he stated that Bulgaria’s defense spending would reach 5% of the GDP. Earlier, however, Radev had spoken about how great it is to be eurosceptic in a tirade targeted at his voters.

In another crucial test for Radev’s foreign policy orientation, his Cabinet has announced that he had a phone conversation with US President Donald Trump and US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, and that he insisted that the United States waive visas for Bulgarian citizens in exchange for allowing US military aircraft to remain stationed at Vasil Levski Airport in Sofia.

This announcement was also likely targeted at Radev’s voters since it could only invoke some laughs for anyone with basic critical-thinking skills and a basic understanding of international politics. The notion that a newly elected Bulgarian leader can make such strong demands of the US President is inadequate, to say the least. Not to mention that there was no confirmation from the White House or any other US institution that such a conversation had taken place. The conversation likely happened but the US side hardly thought much of it.

Against this backdrop, one might as well fear that Radev has too many different faces: he seems to speak in one manner to the Bulgarian public, in another manner to NATO and the EU, in a third manner to Trump, and likely in a fourth manner to Moscow. He seems to be trying to simultaneously placate several very different centers of power.

After 9 years as President of Bulgaria and after two weeks as Prime Minister, the question about who the real Radev is seems to be looming larger than ever.

For the time being, he and his Progressive Bulgaria party don’t seem to be demonstrating any desire to “fight the oligarchy” and may actually serve to regroup it; there are justified suspicions of a backstage deal between him and Borisov-Peevski; there are serious questions about how Radev and his people will treat the Bulgarian democracy and whether they won’t try to impose authoritarianism in some form; and there are very valid concerns that Radev is showing very different faces in foreign policy, with respect to Bulgaria’s foreign partners and allies, which hardly assuage the fears that he might try to change, subvert, or at least chip away at Bulgaria’s pro-Western orientation and its civilizational belonging to the West.

 

Top 22 News Events and Developments in Bulgaria for the Week of May 23-28, 2026, Ranked by Importance & Explained

 

1 New Prime Minister Rumen Radev’s Trip to Brussels and His Meeting with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen; Potential for Unfreezing of €370m in EU Funds under the Recovery and Resilience Facility

Commentary: As already mentioned in the editorial above, the most important thing to note here is that Radev sounded moderate and pro-European in his press conference with Von der Leyen, as opposed to his eurosceptic rhetoric before his domestic electorate. Von der Leyen said the Commission was ready to start unfreezing money, and Bulgaria has 3 months until the deadline to justify the allocation of €2.8 billion under the Facility.

 

2 Prime Minister Radev’s First Meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in Brussels

Commentary: It’s vital to note that Radev made no anti-NATO comments in his remarks; he promised Rutte that Bulgaria will reach 5% of its GDP for defense, but he steered clear of the topic of the War in Ukraine.

 

3 Radev’s Declarations before Bulgarian Media in Paris That Europe Should Start Negotiating with Russia, and That Bulgaria Would Rethink Its Aid for Ukraine

Commentary: This is crucial in terms of what the bulk of Radev’s eurosceptic voters had been hoping he would do: end Bulgarian aid to Ukraine and back Russia in some way in its geopolitical confrontation with the West. These declarations have sent chills down the spines of pro-Western Bulgarians.

 

4 Bulgaria Simultaneously Doesn’t and Does Denounce Russian Strikes on Kyiv

Commentary: In a striking show of duplicity, Bulgaria’s new Radev Cabinet kept quiet when European leaders denounced the May 24 massive Russian attack on Ukraine’s capital Kyiv; however, at the same time, Bulgaria somehow joined 50 mostly European nations at the UN who condemned the Russian strike in a joint statement. This duplicity is already emerging as a pattern for the Radev Cabinet.

 

5 Radev’s Claims That Bulgaria Has Given an “Ultimatum” to US President Trump, Demanding the Waiving of US Visas for Bulgarian Citizens in Exchange for Keeping US Warplanes at Sofia Airport over the War with Iran

Commentary: It sounds ridiculous that Radev could present Trump with any sort of an “ultimatum,” and allowing the US warplanes at Sofia Airport doesn’t seem like it could be connected in any way with the potential visa waiver. The whole declaration seems like another case of Radev’s posturing for his anti-Western electorate, and it’s even doubtful whether he made such a suggestion to Trump. At the same time, if Radev was truly bold and boldly anti-Western, he would have kicked the US warplanes out of Sofia the moment he assumed power; that hasn’t happened.

 

6 Borislav Sarafov Has Finally Resigned as Deputy Chief Prosecutor and Director of the National Investigative Service

Commentary: This is a long-anticipated development; however, it once again serves to underscore the lack of independence of the Bulgarian judiciary. Sarafov had been illegally occupying the post of Bulgaria’s Chief Prosecutor for many months, after initially taking the position only provisionally. He only resigned from it lately when Radev and his Progressive Bulgaria party came to power. There have been declarations from the new rulers that he had to resign, and he did only after getting pressured by the executive branch. He was apparently pressured further to quit even the positions that he held legitimately.

 

7 Bulgaria’s EU Prosecutor Affair: The Former Bulgarian European Prosecutor Teodora Georgieva Has Accused the European Chief Prosecutor Laura Kovesi of Lying

Commentary: The Bulgarian European Prosecutor Affair appears to be one huge mess – just like the Bulgarian judiciary seems to be. It started when a video was leaked showing that murky judiciary lobbyist Petar Petrov, a.k.a. Pepi Evroto (“the Euro”), was telling a woman reported to be Georgieva that she would be appointed as the Bulgarian EU Prosecutor six years ago. In a Bulgarian TV interview last week, Kovesi said Georgieva had been removed because of her dubious election, which occurred under political pressure, and her meetings with Pepi Evroto, to which she has admitted. Georgieva herself had claimed that she had been the victim of attempts to discredit her due to her work. Now Georgieva reacted to Kovesi’s interview by accusing her of lying and having no evidence to support her claims. The entire affair seems like another symptom of the tremendous problems of corruption and backstage influences in the Bulgarian judiciary.

 

8 Murky Bulgarian Backstage Judiciary Lobbyist Wanted Again

Petar Petrov, a.k.a. Pepi Evroto (“the Euro”), a highly murky and infamous figure, a former prosecutor who is missing, and who allegedly influenced the appointments of magistrates and the outcome of trials through backroom dealings and corrupt means, was declared wanted for extortion. A day earlier he was sentenced by the Sofia City Court for forging documents to a fine of €2,556, a ludicrous sentence if all the reports about him are true. His role as a backstage dealer in the Bulgarian judiciary appears to be a striking testament to its allegedly severe corruption issues.

 

9 Radev’s Explanation of Why He Has Refused Bulgaria to Join The Newly Founded War Crimes Tribunal against Russian President Vladimir Putin

Commentary: While the EU has become a founding member of the anti-Putin tribunal, Bulgaria is one of the very few EU member states not individually supporting it. Radev’s explanation why he prevented Bulgaria from joining the rest of its allies and partners sounds highly inadequate, to say the least. He claimed that there was no point in a Putin war crimes tribunal over the War in Ukraine because the Russian leader had not been “captured” and Russia had not “capitulated.” While this declaration will delight his anti-Western voters, the explanation is so inept that it could also be interpreted as contrary to his intentions – namely, that he would be glad if those scenarios were realized, and in that case, he would readily back a tribunal.

 

10 The New Ruling Progressive Bulgaria Party Has Established Its Dominance in Parliament with the Adoption of the New Parliamentary Statutes

Commentary: This is horrible news for Bulgaria’s parliamentary democracy because of the changes that the new statutes provide for. The new ruling party has imposed a speedy adoption of new legislation, severe limitations on the opposition’s rights, and hurting the Parliament’s capacity to control the executive branch through hearings. For instance, the statutes provide only 48 hours between the presentation of new legislation and the committee sitting at which it would be debated and adopted. In another new provision, a total of 48 MPs will be required to propose the formation of temporary parliamentary committees, making those out of reach for the opposition parties, the largest of which – GERB – has 39 MPs.

 

11 Tremendously Positive Polling for Bulgaria’s Ruling Party “Progressive Bulgaria”

Two public opinion polls, by pollsters Trend and Market Links, have found a rise in optimism after the April 19 election, and massive trust in Radev, with 50% of Bulgarians trusting him and 24% saying they don’t trust him. This still seems to be due to inertia from the parliamentary election, with expectations running high, as the 1.5 million Radev voters still haven’t had enough time to become disappointed. This also raises the question of the critical thinking abilities of many Bulgarian voters.

 

12 Fresh Batch of Tensions between Bulgaria and North Macedonia

Commentary: The new Bulgarian Cabinet has started its relations with neighboring North Macedonia on the wrong foot, after the new Bulgarian Foreign Minister, Velislava Petrova, called its citizens “North-Macedonians,” rather than “Macedonians,” which they prefer. Bulgaria’s relations with North Macedonia, whose people and territories were practically part of the Bulgarian nation from the early Middle Ages until the Communist takeover of 1944, remain an open wound. The tensions were supposed to subside after this week’s meeting of the Bulgarian and North Macedonian foreign ministers in Sweden, but that wasn’t enough. North Macedonia’s Prime Minister Hristian Mickoski has once again refused to recognize Bulgarians in the constitution, which is now a requirement of the European Union for starting accession negotiations. Mickoski even refused to organize a referendum on the issue after the Macedonian opposition proposed it. Meanwhile, it has been revealed that Serbia, which is largely behind the creation of the Macedonian national identity, funded the organizers of a large rally in support of Mickoski in the town of Kumanovo. The relations between Bulgaria and North Macedonia are likely to continue being sour, with the Mickoski Cabinet likely to remain unyielding on the issue of including Bulgarians in in the Macedonian constitution.

 

13 The Radev Cabinet May Have Taken Its First Step toward Raising Taxes

Commentary: While Rumen Radev and his Progressive Bulgaria party have been vowing not to raise any taxes, they have practically taken a first step towards doing so, after the new rulers of Bulgaria have decided to raise the ceiling pay for employees’ mandatory social insurance contributions; thus, the maximum ceiling will spike by 9%, reaching €2,300, as of August 1. The measure, which will likely become part of the 2026 budget that Progressive Bulgaria is working on, will help raise more revenue for the state. In another relevant development, the new ruling party is discussing with trade unions and employers’ associations the discontinuation of the mechanism that automatically raises Bulgaria’s minimum monthly salary based on the growth of the average gross salary. The measure could be welcomed by the business sector but it can hardly generate much excitement among the public given that Bulgaria “boasts” the lowest minimum monthly wage in the EU at €620.

 

14 Bulgaria’s New Rulers Are Gearing Up to Take On Massive New State Debt

Commentary: In an indication that Bulgaria’s new ruling party “Progressive Bulgaria” is hardly dead set on carrying out painful reforms carrying out painful reforms but would instead look for easier solutions, Konstantin Prodanov, one of the leading MPs in the party on finance, has declared the taking on new debt an “objective inevitability.” He didn’t specify the amount but said at least €2.5 billion are owed by the central government under current contracts, including about €1 billion to municipalities. The new borrowing seems like an easy fix that could turn painful down the road.

 

15 Bulgaria’s New Rulers Mulling Amending the Constitution

Commentary: The new ruling Progressive Bulgaria party has made it clear it is considering changing the nation’s constitution, according to its parliamentary group chair, Petar Vitanov, a former Socialist Party operative. He didn’t specify the potential amendments but hinted they might have to do with the way caretaker governments are set up. According to the latest constitutional changes in Bulgaria, the ceremonial President can select the caretaker Prime Minister only from a handful of people holding certain government positions like Parliament Speaker, for example. At this point, it cannot be judged what effects any potential changes of the Constitution by the new rulers would have; but the ruling party would need opposition support because the amendments require 160 MP votes, a two-thirds majority.

 

16 Prime Minister Radev’s Meeting with French President Macron in Paris

Commentary: Radev’s second foreign visit was to Paris, to meet with Macron. Interestingly enough, they gave no joint press conference – which could or could not be the result of Radev’s visit to Berlin the previous week and his press conference with Chancellor Merz, which wasn’t exactly the most flattering event for Radev himself. According to the Bulgarian government, Radev and Macron discussed “cooperation” as well as Bulgaria’s “reserves” about the EU budget and the War in Ukraine. Another fact worth noting is that, according to reports in the few decent Bulgarian media outlets, there was “zero” media interest in France in Radev’s visit – which could or could not be deemed as an indication of both Bulgaria’s and Radev’s lack of geopolitical significance.

 

17 Radev Declaring the Bulgarian Alphabet a ‘Shield’ against the ‘Global World of Identity Erasure’   

Commentary: In a brand-new outburst seemingly designed to delight his anti-Western voters, Prime Minister Radev has declared that the Bulgarian alphabet has turned into “our shield” against the globalized world. His remark was on the occasion of one of Bulgaria’s national holidays, May 24, the Day of the Bulgarian Alphabet, Literature, and Culture. The remark could be deemed relatively inadequate, as the Bulgarian alphabet and literary tradition were designed to connect Bulgaria to the civilized Christian world in the 9^th century, and have continued to do so ever since, rather than isolate it and shield it.

 

18 Hit Singer and Eurovision Winner DARA Trolls Radev

Commentary: In a rare display of civic valor by a celebrity, DARA, the hit Bulgarian winner of the 2026 Eurovision song contest, trolled the new Prime Minister Radev. She attended a meeting with Radev at the Council of Ministers where she accepted flowers from him. But she declared that she was hoping to see “real changes” in Bulgaria, the kind of changes demanded by the massive anti-corruption protests in December 2025. DARA may have hinted at the fact that the protests were not organized by Radev, but, rather, by a center-right, prodemocracy coalition, but somehow, four months later, he capitalized on them by winning the general election in a landslide, a paradox that many in Bulgaria’s pro-democratic community deem unfair.

 

19 Massive Floods in Central Bulgaria

Commentary: Torrential rains have affected a number of cities and towns in Central North Bulgaria, such as Gabrovo, Sevlievo and Byala. Traditionally, Bulgaria’s institutions are ill-prepared for such disasters, and the calamity is worsened by inadequate measures such as illegal construction, but this time no such judgment can be made.

 

20 An Entire Illegal Town Has Been Constructed near the Black Sea City of Varna

Commentary: In what is shaping to be a tremendous public scandal in Bulgaria, it has been revealed that an entire town with over 100 buildings was constructed illegally near Varna in an area called “Baba Alino,” after the destruction of a local forest. The existence of the illegal development was brought to public attention by Varna Mayor Blagomir Kotsev. The construction of the illegal town was carried out by a murky Ukrainian businessman named Oleg Nevzorov and his company called “KUB”. The construction has been going on for at least 3 years, and it demonstrates a staggering level of corruption and institutional failure across a wide range of Bulgarian government authorities, both local and national. The list of institutions that are somehow involved in the scandal is shocking: from construction supervision to the municipality, to the police, forestry and environmental services, to the national security agency.

 

21 The Mayor of the City of Kardzhali Was Interrogated

Commentary: Erol Myumyum, the mayor of the city of Kardzhali in Southern Bulgaria, was technically not arrested but escorted by police to the police station and interrogated. Myumyun is from the ethnic Turkish party DPS, and close to DPS leader and alleged oligarch Delyan Peevski. He was released after the interrogation, and little details have been made available about its reason. However, the entire episode has been welcomed by Radev’s supporters as an instance in which he is supposedly starting to crack down on the “Borisov-Peevski Model” (discussed in the editorial above). For the time being, it seems hardly likely that this would be the case, and the interrogation seems like an isolated affair. However, it did give Peevski a reason to complain publicly of “police violence” by Interior Minister Ivan Demerdzhiev, and to insist that Radev intervene.

 

22 A Prosecutor’s Wanted Bandit Son Allegedly Aided by Police Sources 

Commentary: A young man, or, rather, a bandit, named Vasil Mihaylov, who is widely known as “the Prosecutor’s Son” because his father is a prosecutor in Pernik near Sofia, has been arrested lately after he had been wanted for a long time. Mihaylov has been involved in various crimes, including cases of public battery. New revelations have emerged, ranging from claims by his victims’ lawyer to admissions by Interior Minister Ivan Demerdzhiev – that the young bandit has been aided by police sources and by an acting prosecutor leaking information to help him evade capture. While Mihaylov is a low-level criminal, the entire situation is telling about Bulgaria’s law enforcement system.

 

(Other) Curiosities and Absurdities in Bulgaria This Week

Note: This is a mishmash category of sorts; these are presented in a random order. Whether a certain development is a curiosity or an absurdity, it’s for the reader to decide.

 

Former Bulgarian Politics Kingmaker Cheated Out of Properties

Commentary: In a rather ironic turn of events, Ahmed Dogan, the founder and long-time leader of Bulgaria’s ethnic Turkish party DPS, was cheated out of his properties and company shares after a notary public certified that his forged signature was real. Dogan was a de facto “kingmaker” in Bulgarian politics for many years, especially between 2001 and 2009. Among other things, he was a long-time collaborator with the State Security service of Communist Bulgaria. In 2010, this analyst wrote an article called “Ahmed Dogan. Or ‘Who’s Your Daddy?’ in Bulgarian Politics”. And in 2013, this analyst was interviewed by The Guardian over what seemed like a fake Dogan assassination attempt. Dogan’s downfall started in 2024, when alleged oligarch Delyan Peevski, largely Dogan’s creation, dethroned him and took over the DPS party from within. Dogan is known for publicly admitting on TV in 2005 that Bulgarian political parties were founded by “rings of firms” that they surround themselves with. In any case, as Dogan once seemed omnipotent, in his present-day ordeal the irony writes itself.

 

Foreign Ambassadors Recite Emblematic Poem for Day of the Bulgarian Alphabet

Commentary: On the occasion of May 24, the Day of Bulgarian Alphabet and Culture, foreign ambassadors have recorded a video reciting verses from the poem “The Bulgarian Language” by poet and writer Ivan Vazov. The video was initiated by the UK Embassy and featured the ambassadors of the UK, Ukraine, Austria, Cambodia, Poland, Moldova, Slovenia, Germany, and Hungary. Needless to say, this is a much better and more meaningful greeting for Bulgarians than Rumen Radev’s “shield” declaration (see above).

 

Bulgaria’s President Iliyana Yotova ‘Admitted’ to Iron Maiden

Commentary: Bulgaria’s President Iliyana Yotova received the members of the Iron Maiden band at the Presidency. Yotova, who was Radev’s vice president for 9 years, a former journalist and Socialist Party operative, is known for her red hair. What’s notable here is that when the public saw this photo of hers with the metal band, many Bulgarians joked that Yotova had been admitted as Iron Maiden’s newest member.

 

A Crane Crushes the Dome of 169-Year-Old Church near Sofia

Commentary: In a crazy accident, a crane that was supposed to work on the repairs to a 169-year-old church in Golema Rakovitsa near Sofia dropped the church’s dome and it shattered. Video here, photo here. The repairs of the church will be much more complicated and expensive after the accident.

 

Manipulated Photo Claims Bulgaria’s Ex-Prime Minister Delivers Food

Commentary: In one of the funniest moments of anti-democratic propaganda in Bulgaria, a manipulated photo claims to show Andrey Gyurov, Bulgaria’s caretaker Prime Minister in February-April 2026, being employed as a food deliverer. The photo is ludicrous but indicative of the methods of anti-democratic and anti-Western propaganda in Bulgaria. Gyurov’s work as a whole has received positive feedback from many Bulgarians.

 

Bulgaria’s New Environment Minister Dispels Reports about Culture Funding Cuts

Commentary: In what might as well be deemed an episode showing chaos in the new Bulgarian Cabinet, Environment Minister Rositsa Karamfilova declared on live TV that reports that funding for culture would be slashed by 10% by Radev’s government were false. It’s intriguing that the announcement in question had to come from her.

 

25% of Bulgarian Immigrants in Germany Live on Welfare

Commentary: In a telling development that might as well go to a “No Comment” rubric, statistical data from the German employment agency show that over 100,000 out of a total of 420,000 Bulgarian immigrants in Germany subsist on welfare payments. That’s indicative of their skills, their motivation for going to Germany or both.

 

Bulgaria Has Been Procuring 3D Radars in an ‘Emergency’ for 10 Years

Commentary: The headline speaks for itself but it is also indicative of the mismanagement and lack of political will that Bulgaria’s defense and military have to cope with. Acquiring 3D radars was supposed to be done in a rush 10 years ago, but still hasn’t been realized. This largely invalidates Bulgaria’s embattled acquisition of F-16 fighter jets. According to Mediapool.bg, the 10-year delay will cost Bulgaria’s taxpayers an extra €50 million.

 

No More VIP Entrances to Parliament for Borisov and Peevski

Commentary: Two of the main personages in Bulgarian politics – GERB leader Boyko Borisov and DPS leader Delyan Peevski – who were discussed in detail in the editorial above – will no longer be allowed to use the inner yard of the Bulgarian Parliament building to enter with their security details. They have been using the inner yard to avoid reporters and citizens as well as the obligatory security checks which are not administered at the VIP entrance. Here is a video of Peevski using the VIP inner yard entrance. The change was made at the insistence of Parliament Speaker Mihaela Dotsova, so that’s at least one positive change that has stemmed from Progressive Bulgaria’s assumption of power.

 

Election Watch

Law Professor Hints He Might Run for President

Commentary: Law professor Daniel Valchev has not rejected reports that he could run for President in Bulgaria’s presidential election in the fall. Valchev was a Deputy Prime Minister of Bulgaria in 2005-2009 from the party of the former Tsar (or King) Simeon II Saxe-Coburg. He is presently head of the Law Department of Sofia University. Valchev might as well be judged a potential candidate who could be friendly to the oligarchy. His intellectualism has often been laced with cynicism, including in hot-mic comments in 2008. He could be a candidate favored by some of the establishment populist parties.

 

Borisov Wants a Joint Candidate with Pro-Democratic Parties

Bulgaria’s former long-time Prime Minister Boyko Borisov, who may or may not be described as an oligarch in his own right, has insisted that a joint candidate of his party GERB and the former center-right pro-democratic coalition of PPDB (“We Continue the Change – Democratic Bulgaria”) (which fell apart after the April 19, 2026, election) could win the 2026 presidential election. Borisov has long been trying to stage joint actions with the pro-Western, pro-democratic parties, using them to legitimize himself and his own party GERB as pro-Western. In those cases, in which he has entered coalition governments with the democratic center-right – like in 2014-2017 and 2023-2024 – he has managed to mostly outsmart and rather marginalize them to his, his party’s and the oligarchy’s benefit.

 

Top Quotes This Week

“We now have a Boyko Borisov who speaks English… The [Borisov-Peevski] model just exchanged one general for another.”

Kaloyan Metodiev, a political scientist who was the head of Rumen Radev’s cabinet at the Presidency until 2021. He referred to Borisov’s poor English skills, Radev’s better English skills, and the fact that Borisov is a general from the Interior Ministry, while Radev is a general from the Bulgarian Air Force.

 

“About Radev’s conversation with Donald Trump – it’s unclear whether he’s pro-western or pro-eastern but it seems clear that he is pro-authoritarian – he has such trends and looks for this kind of leaders, who can guarantee his model.”

Kaloyan Metodiev again

 

“The people that I appointed weren’t loyal personally to me but to the state, and now [they are] bringing back some bandits of the Borisov and Peevski status quo, for instance, at the district directorate of agriculture in Silistra or at the Bulgarian Agency for Food Safety.”

Ivan Hristanov, former Minister of Agriculture at the caretaker Gyurov Cabinet in February-April 2026, referring to Radev’s appointments.

“What we are seeing in the early Radev as Prime Minister is the later Borisov – despotism, a total disregard for the voice of the non-governmental sector a dictatorship; if we don’t have a President who would counter the Cabinet, we are entering the later Borisov when he was in control of the Parliament, the Cabinet, and the Presidency – a complete dictatorship.”

Ivan Hristanov again

 

“Fruits and vegetables with high levels of pesticides are entering without hurdles through the Kapitan Andreevo border crossing [on the Bulgarian-Turkish border]. They are realized at the market in Bulgaria, and in the entire EU since this is a foreign border for the European Union. The gap in control happens by manipulating the results from the samples at the state laboratory at the border.”

Angel Mavroski, former head of the Bulgarian Agency for Food Safety, who was fired by the Radev Cabinet, explaining the changes following his ouster.

 

“After the encouraging news from the UN [of denouncing the Russian strikes on Kyiv] that Bulgaria will stay the course of its behavior towards its alliance commitments to security in Europe and Ukraine, Prime Minister Radev has just poured a diplomatic but ice-cold shower over everybody.”

Georg Georgiev, former Foreign Minister from Borisov’s GERB party, criticizing Radev’s remarks about ending any aid to Ukraine.

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